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The simple perception of an object can potentiate an associated action. This affordance
effect depends heavily on the action context in which the object is presented. In recent
years, psychologists, psychiatrists, and phenomenologists have agreed that subjects
with schizophrenia may not perceive the affordances of people or objects that could
lead to a loss of ease in their actions. We examined whether the addition of contextually
congruent elements, during the perception of everyday objects, could promote the
emergence of object-affordance effects in subjects with schizophrenia and controls.
Participants performed two Stimulus–Response-Compatibility tasks in which they were
presented with semantic primes related to sense of property (Experiment 1) or goal
of action (Experiment 2) prior to viewing each graspable object. Controls responded
faster when their response hand and the graspable part of the object were compatibly
oriented, but only when the context was congruent with the individual’s needs and
goals. When the context operated as a constraint, the affordance-effect was disrupted.
These results support the understanding that object-affordance is flexible and not just
intrinsic to an object. However, the absence of this object-affordance effect in subjects
with schizophrenia suggests the possible impairment of their ability to experience the
internal simulation of motor action potentialities. In such case, all activities of daily
life would require the involvement of higher cognitive processes rather than lower
level sensorimotor processes. The study of schizophrenia requires the consideration of
concepts and methods that arise from the theories of embodied and situated cognition.
Keywords: context, embodiment, goals of action, object-affordance effect, schizophrenia, sense of property,
sensorimotor simulation, Stimulus–Response-Compatibility
INTRODUCTION
Embodied theories of cognition address the physical, motivational, and environmental dimensions
of an individual’s daily experience (Varela et al., 1992). Such a view posits that cognition emerges
from the cooperation and co-evolution of perceptual and motor systems that allow sensorimotor
patterns to be implemented. Perception is therefore more proactive toward than reactive to the
individual’s environment (Berthoz and Petit, 2003; Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003; Gallese, 2007;
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Barsalou, 2008, 2009; Vandevoorde, 2011); it’s an internal
simulation of action, designed for understanding the meaning
of his environment (Berthoz, 2003). The subject builds the
world in which he lives and acts, in accordance with his
perception of that environment (Glenberg et al., 2013) and
the actions he performs within it. Consequently, he perceives
through active exploration and intentional activity according
to his goals, tempered by intrinsic constraints of perceptual
systems and context, and not simply by interpreting sensory
messages (Haggard, 2005). This binding of action and perception
allows the most economical solution to emerge from a set of
possible actions. Gibson (1977, 1979) described “affordance” as
the subject’s faculty to guide his or her behavior, according to the
perception of what the environment is offering in terms of action
potentialities.
In cognitive psychology, numerous studies have operationa-
lized this concept of affordance, (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998,
2001, 2004; Ellis and Tucker, 2000; Borghi et al., 2012). In
their seminal study, Tucker and Ellis (1998) associated the
orientation of the typical graspable part of an object with the hand
used by a participant to respond to instructions regarding the
object, observing that this compatibility of orientations facilitates
response. They showed that perception of an object automatically
potentiates related actions (via simulation mechanisms) even in
the absence of instruction or explicit intention to act.
However, others describe an implicit motor intentionality to
act on an object as a basis of the affordance effect. Naming an
object automatically elicits action potentialities not elicited by
its passive viewing alone; its naming evokes gestural knowledge
of the object’s form and function (Bub and Masson, 2006). The
behavioral impact of perceived object affordance seems to depend
heavily on the action context in which the object is presented to
carry on the subject motor intentionality.
These action potentialities could match behavior or attitude
sketches (“covert behaviors”) that the individual reenacts as
he perceives environmental stimuli, and these simulations of
action (Berthoz and Petit, 2006) might represent a third
component that requires incorporation into the relation between
perception and action (Garbarini and Adenzato, 2004). At
the neuronal level, the brain employs similar neural resources
and dynamic representations to execute, imagine, and perceive
actions (Jeannerod, 2006; Barsalou, 2008). This ability to simulate
an action in the absence of its effective implementation, which is
underpinned by “canonical” and “mirror” neural networks, give
meaning to the surrounding world (subjects and objects). In this
case, knowledge is enacted and carries the implicit meaning of
perceived world.
Disembodiment in Schizophrenia
“This tacit or enacted knowledge is also the basis of “common
sense” (Blankenburg, 2001; Fuchs, 2001): it provides a fluid,
automatic, and context-sensitive pre-understanding of everyday
situations, thus connecting self and world through a basic
habituality and familiarity” (Fuchs, 2015, p. 199).
Embodied theories of cognition highlight the dependence
of cognition on the subject’s experience of the world without
addressing mental pathologies, especially schizophrenia.
However, some approaches to psychopathology that consider
the phenomenological dimension of embodiment (Sass
and Parnas, 2003; Fuchs, 2005) describe schizophrenia as a
disturbance of the individual’s relationship with the world and
others that constitutes a “lack of common sense” (Stanghellini,
2000).
From a clinical perspective, therapists report that their patients
with schizophrenia experience some perceptual or cognitive
fragmentation of the world accompanied by a certain loss of ease
in their actions. As a result, they may experience a disintegration
of habits or automatic practices. Due to an alteration of the
body-based involvement, patients have to “think” deliberately
about each action, before to perform it. Sass (2004, p. 136)
describes the failure of patients with schizophrenia to perceive
the affordances of people, things, or actions that give the objects
“practical significance that, for example, make a chair a thing-
to-sit-on, a hammer something-to-pound-with, or a human body
something to be approached, feared, or caressed.”
Until now, experimental studies have focused on the
impairment in the motor understanding of other’s behaviors in
schizophrenia, as revealed by a reduced activation of the mirror
neural network. Numerous studies in patients show an inherent
deficit that inactivates this neural network (Mehta et al., 2014a).
Using different paradigms, most studies showed reduced mirror
neuron activity (MNA) and greater deficits in theory of mind
(Mehta et al., 2014b), emotion recognition (Mehta et al., 2014b),
and expression (Varcin et al., 2010), action imitation (Park et al.,
2008; Thakkar et al., 2014), and observation (Enticott et al., 2008)
in patients. If this mirror neural network enables the internal
simulation of behaviors, it is not surprising that individuals
with schizophrenia have difficulties relating with the world in
interpersonal relationships (Mehta et al., 2014b).
However, to our knowledge, only few studies extend this line
of research to object’s perception. For example, Delerue and
Boucart (2012) noted the absence of a perception-action link
in schizophrenia when they measured eye-tracking during an
active visual scanning task to show the decoupling of an object’s
perception from the potential action. They demonstrated that
the visual exploration of control subjects varied according to
the instructions given, to name the object visually presented or
to name the action inferred by the object. When participants
had to name the object, they explored only the part useful for
its identification, focusing, for example, on the tines of a fork.
However, when they had to name the action, they explored
the whole object, extending their visual explorations, in this
case, to the handle, the graspable part of the fork. In contrast,
visual explorations of patients were similar for the two tasks; in
each case, they focused essentially on the useful part (tines) to
identify the object (fork). Though patients with schizophrenia
demonstrated no abnormalities in naming objects, the absence of
facilitation in naming the actions of objects could reflect impaired
perception of affordance.
Our team also studied the affordance in schizophrenia (Sevos
et al., 2013). Since some authors suggested that “[i]f sensory
and motor processes are basic to all other cognition, as much
research in embodied cognitive science posits, then disorders
that have traditionally been viewed as dysfunctions of higher
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cognitive processes could in fact be explained by lower level
sensorimotor processes.” (Drayson, 2009, p. 338), we proposed
to study a potential deficit of sensorimotor integration, instead
of higher cognitive dysfunction, in this pathology. We evaluated
whether perceived objects automatically evoke corresponding
action processes (sensorimotor integration) using a Stimulus–
Response-Compatibility (SRC) paradigm that provides for a
shorter response time when the stimulus and response share
the same properties (Sevos et al., 2013). In our first experiment
(Experiment 1), we observed faster response times when the
spatial localization of a stimulus and of the motor response
were compatible (Simon effect), and patients with schizophrenia
showed no impairment of visuo-spatial integration in this task. In
our second experiment (Experiment 2), we replicated the tasks of
Tucker and Ellis (1998) that measured the effect of compatibility
between the orientations of common graspable objects and the
hand with which the subject was to respond to instructions
(object-based affordance effect). The absence of this effect even
in patients with mild symptom severity suggested no automatic
binding of perception and action in this population.
If a relationship between the features of a motoric object and
the action to be carried out with it does not occur automatically,
is it possible that adding contextual elements, making the action
more relevant to the patient’s needs and wishes, could induce this
automatic link between perception and action?
Indeed, in controls, it is known that the context in which
an object is observed influences how the object is perceived.
The activation of action potentialities, such as grasp, is not
completely automatic but depends rather on how attention is
oriented toward the action-relevant features of an object. For
example, the perception of the same object (door handle) could
trigger different sensorimotor simulations (Tipper et al., 2006).
Affordance effects were obtained only when subjects had to
discriminate properties of an object linked to action (a shape);
they did not occur when they had to discriminate color.
The Influence of Variations in Context on
Object-Affordance Effects
An individual’s range of potentially available motor actions also
depends on his unique “history” of interactions between the
object perceived and actions carried out with it. Moreover,
the context acts as either a resource or constraint according
to the situation, the subject’s ability to exploit environmental
resources, and the subject’s goals of action (Creem and
Proffitt, 2001). Therefore, it is not surprising that there is
widespread interest in the modulation of affordance effects in
various experimental contexts (Borghi et al., 2012; Borghi and
Riggio, 2015). Researchers disagree regarding the degree of
automaticity of action potentiations versus task- and context-
dependent activations (Creem-Regehr and Lee, 2005; Buxbaum
and Kalenine, 2010; Borghi and Riggio, 2015). Nevertheless,
efforts have been made to clarify these questions by modifying
the context of experimental settings. Among such studies, we
will emphasize those that address goals of action and sense of
property.
Goals of Action
The context in which an object is observed has been shown
to influence how it is perceived. Some authors believe that
affordance effects are not immutable but may vary according to
the observer’s goals and intentions in a given environment: the
perception of one object might trigger different sensorimotor
simulations. The simultaneous automaticity of the activation of
affordance and the flexibility of its modulation according to
the task and the physical and social context has been recently
shown (Borghi and Riggio, 2015) as well as the same object
can evoke different affordances (manipulative or functional grip)
according to context (Kalénine et al., 2014). In the same idea,
some authors have demonstrated a motor facilitation when two
objects are congruent and disposed in a functional way to imply
a specific action (Yoon et al., 2010), and that presenting a
photo of a hand with prehensile posture congruent with that
of the hand with which the subject was to respond facilitated
the response to objects (Borghi et al., 2012). By implying the
individual’s underlying goal, the photo would more strongly
induce interaction between the object and action. A facilitation
effect in conditions of both functional congruency between two
objects (presenting together a bottle and glass rather than a
bottle and ball) and the status of the objects (presenting together
a bottle and empty glass rather than a bottle and full glass)
was also reported (De Stefani et al., 2012). The object’s state
also appears to influence affordances, since larger effects were
observed when the perceived object appeared active (a door
handle that was depressed) rather than passive (the door handle
in apparent inactivity) (Tipper et al., 2006). All these studies
showed the flexible experience of objects by individuals and the
modulation of their perception according to their use in a given
context.
Semantic material has also been used to investigate the
modulation of affordance effects according to goals of action.
Indeed, language, as memory or perception, implies sensorimotor
simulation mechanisms linked to objects or situations to which
these linguistic expressions refer (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002; Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Gallese, 2009; Borghi and
Pecher, 2011). In particular, words evoke object affordance
just as visual stimuli do (Gibson, 1979). This functional link
between language and motor systems results from the often
simultaneous occurrence of actions and their referents; neural
populations, recruited to process a word and the referent body
movement, frequently fire together and become strongly linked
(Pulvermüller, 1999, 2001).
Borghi and Riggio (2009) showed that reading a sentence
as a prime of an visual object automatically activate the goal
of the action but only when the sentence included a verb of
action compared with a verb of observation. They also observed
an interference effect when the action sentence and perceived
object were incongruent. Using a similar design, Costantini et al.
(2011) observed the triggering of a simulation effect by an action
sentence, but only when the proximity of objects permitted bodily
interaction (i.e., in the peripersonal space). Thus, specifying the
proper conventional use of an object encourages the simulation
of a particular pattern of motor response.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1551
fpsyg-07-01551 October 3, 2016 Time: 10:38 # 4
Sevos et al. Contextual Affordance Effects in Schizophrenia
On the other hand, some authors do not show that semantic
context leads to an automatic and invariant simulation of specific
motor programs (Van Dam et al., 2010). Indeed, in a functional
magnetic resonance imaging task that involved words with both
motor and visual characteristics, such as tennis ball and boxing
gloves, stronger activation of motor areas when subjects thought
about words with motor characteristics was reported (Van Dam
et al., 2012). These findings suggest that the activation of
motor-specific information during action-word comprehension
is flexible and contextually dependent.
Sense of Property
Affordance effects can depend on the actor’s sense of who owns
the objects with which he interacts. This sense of property as
consider as a basic mechanism that emerges automatically even
during tasks not directly related to ownership (Tummolini et al.,
2013). Using a SRC paradigm, Constable et al. (2011) showed
variation in action potentialities evoked during the perception
of objects according to the individual’s understanding of who
owned the object. They asked participants to decorate a cup and
use it at home to create the feeling that they owned the cup.
Fifteen days later, participants performed a task on computer that
used photos of different cups: their own, one decorated by the
investigator, and two others with no defined owner. Sensorimotor
compatibility effects were shown for all photos except those
of the investigator’s cup. The authors conclude that a sense of
ownership may be embodied in the visuomotor system that is
sensitive to the status of an object’s ownership and favors the
inhibition of action that involves another person’s objects rather
than the facilitation of action toward self-owned objects. These
data fit with the hypothesis of an early developmental sense of
property. Indeed, as early as age four, children understand that
inappropriate interaction with objects they do not own can result
in negative consequences (Neary et al., 2009).
The sense of property is partly determined by one’s
identity (Dittmar, 1992), and name and surname are essential
components of that identity. The repetition of an individual’s
names throughout daily life could automatically draw auditory
and visual attention to these words (Moray, 1959; Wood and
Cowan, 1995; Shapiro et al., 1997) and evoke more memories and
emotions than other words do. The detection of one’s surname
among other stimuli has been demonstrated on both behavioral
(Oswald et al., 1960) and cerebral levels (Perrin et al., 1999), even
during sleep. One’s surname seems to be a pertinent ecological
stimulus for reference to “self ” (Perrin et al., 2005). Markman
and Brendl (2005) presented individuals’ own surnames in the
middle of a screen and asked participants to categorize the
valence of positive or negative adjectives placed near or far from
their surname. Half of the participants were instructed to pull
a lever toward themselves in response to positive adjectives and
to push it away in response to negative adjectives, and the other
half were given the reverse instructions. Participants responded
faster when positive adjectives were closer to their surname
and when negative words were further away, irrespective of the
participant’s pushing or pulling the lever. The authors concluded
that the speed of response movements depended more on the
representation of the participant’s self-the subject’s surname on
the screen-than the representation of their body, the physical
activity of pushing or pulling of the lever.
If attentional processes can automatically be attracted by self-
relevant items (as participant’s names -Moray, 1959; Gray et al.,
2004- or object ownership -Turk et al., 2011), we can then expect
that this kind of stimuli have an impact on other cognitive or
behavioral processes.
The Present Study
We examined whether the addition of a more salient action
context can promote the emergence of affordance effect during
the perception of everyday objects in patients with schizophrenia.
Indeed, in this population, the simple perception of an object
without context does not automatically evoke corresponding
action processes, and this lack of sensorimotor integration (Sevos
et al., 2013) could be associated with the absence of visual
exploration of the action-relevant features of the object (Delerue
and Boucart, 2012).
In this study, we explored the emergence of object-affordance
effects in schizophrenia using variations of new experimental
contexts in two experiments focusing on action potentiation
during the perception of object handling. In the first experiment
(Experiment 1), we began with the SRC paradigm of Tucker and
Ellis (1998) and added the presentation of primes (surnames) to
enhance the context, using the participant’s surname or “Rani”
as an imaginary surname to act as a reference of owning or
not owning the perceived object. In the second experiment
(Experiment 2), we added action sentences primes that were
congruent or not with the goal of action induced by the
conventional use of a given object. For example, we would present
the sentence “For watering plants” followed by a photo of a
watering can or a remote control.
EXPERIMENT 1
To evaluate if the sense of property can modulate object’s
affordance effects (in controls and patients with schizophrenia),
we introduced surnames, known to be ecological stimuli for self-
reference (Markman and Brendl, 2005; Perrin et al., 2005), as
primes to enhance the context of an object.
Because people are also known to interact with objects
differently based on whether the objects belong to them or not
(Constable et al., 2011), we considered the affordance effects
related to the introduction of surnames to reference the subject’s
owning (participant’s name) or not owning (imaginary name,
“Rani”) the perceived objects. We expected the emergence of
affordance effects in both populations when objects were primed
with the participant’s surname but not the imaginary name.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants included 18 patients with schizophrenia (16 men,
2 women) recruited in the psychiatric departments of the
University Hospital of Saint-Étienne and 18 healthy comparison
subjects (15 men, 3 women) recruited by advertisement in the
local newspaper (See Table 1 for demographic comparisons).
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TABLE 1 | Comparison of ages, years of education, and scores on the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (SD) between patients with






Age (years) 37.3 (6.9) 36.9 (8.8) t = 0.126; P = 0.900
Education (years) 12.1 (2.5) 11.2 (2.7) t = 0.949; P = 0.349
Edinburgh score (/20) 19.3 (1.1) 18.6 (1.7) t = 1.552; P = 0.130
PANSS positive 13.1 (3) / /
PANSS negative 16.7 (7) / /
Illness duration (months) 172.33 (93.9) / /
All were volunteers and naive about the hypothesis of
the experiment. The local ethics committee of Saint-Étienne
approved the study (N◦ IORG0007394), and written consent was
obtained from all participants after the nature of the procedures
was fully explained.
Patients were included with a DSM-5 diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and no change
in antipsychotic medication and/or clinical status within 4 weeks
prior to the study. The same senior psychiatrist assessed all
patients using the positive and negative syndrome scale (PANSS;
Kay et al., 1987). All were stable outpatients living in their own
accommodations and participating in various psychosocial or
professional activities.
Across groups, participants were excluded for (1) a diagnosis
of neurological brain disorder or head trauma with loss of
consciousness, (2) mental retardation, and/or (3) a history of
substance abuse over the last 6 months. All participants were
right handed (scores> 14, assessed using the modified Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971).
A power analysis, conducted via G∗Power Software (Faul et al.,
2007), with Cohen’s recommendations (Cohen, 1988), which
assumed a medium effect size of 0.25 for the ANOVA with
one between-subjects factor and three within-subjects factors
(eight levels as repeated measures), indicated that a total of 20,
18, and 16 participants were required, respectively, to have a
90, 85, or 80% power (a minimum required by Cohen, 1988)
of detecting a significant effect at p-value of 0.05. Thus, our
proposed sample size of 36 subjects will be more than adequate
for the main objective of this study. The power analysis which
assumed a medium effect size of 0.25 for the ANOVA with three
within-subjects factors in each group of participants (controls
and schizophrenics) indicated that a total of 20, 18, and 16
participants were required to have 90, 85, and 80% power of
detecting a significant effect at p-value of 0.05. In the present
study, 18 subjects performed all conditions in each group.
Apparatus and Materials
We employed the same material we used previously (Sevos et al.,
2013), adding only a visual prime (participant’s surname or the
imaginary surname “Rani”) before presenting each object in each
trial. We chose an imaginary name to avoid reference to any of
the participants. Names printed in black 32-point Arial font were
presented to subjects in the middle of a white screen.
A total of 88 black-and-white photographs of 22 objects
graspable by one hand (Appendix 1) were presented in two
horizontal (compatible with either a right- or left-handed grasp)
and two vertical (upright or inverted) orientations (Figure 1)
on the computer screen. The average size of photos was
512 × 384 pixels to maintain the proportions of each object at
a distance of 50 cm.
Design and Procedure
Participants were seated with their heads 50 cm in front of the
screen and first shown every photo in both orientations to ensure
they could recognize each object upright and inverted.
During the task, they were required to indicate as quickly as
possible whether the object was upright or inverted by pressing
the corresponding response key. Each participant carried out
two blocks of 88 trials with a break of 3 min between blocks.
In one block, subjects were to respond with their right hand
for upright objects and their left hand for inverted objects.
In the second block, they were asked to do the opposite –
to respond with their right hand for inverted objects and
their left hand for upright objects. The order of these blocks
was counterbalanced between subjects. Within each block, 44
randomized trials were primed by the participant’s surname and
the other 44, by the imaginary surname “Rani.” Before carrying
out each block, the subject was informed that his surname would
appear before objects as if he owned them or the surname
Rani would appear before objects as if Rani owned them, and
FIGURE 1 | Examples of the stimuli used in Experiment 1: left
orientation, upright; right orientation, upright; left orientation, inverted;
right orientation, inverted.
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they were reminded to respond to objects according to the
object’s orientation and not the presented surname. A 1-min
break was proposed after the first 44 trials. The order of primes
was also counterbalanced between participants. Moreover, for
each participant, objects primed by their own surname were
never primed by Rani, and objects primed by Rani were never
primed by their own surname, and the order of presentation was
counterbalanced between subjects. During the whole experiment,
participants were instructed to keep their right finger on a
right response key (L) and their left finger on a left response
key (S). Response keys were situated 15 cm apart and 20 cm
in front of the screen, on a standard European (AZERTY)
keyboard.
Each participant received six practice trials for each kind of
prime (surname of participant or Rani) before each block. Each
experimental trial started with the presentation of the prime in
the center of the screen for 250 ms followed immediately by a
photo of one of the 22 objects. The stimulus stayed on the screen
until an answer was given or up to 3000 ms. A brief auditory tone
on the computer indicated errors to participants.
Results
For all conditions, participants responded within the required
time limit of 3000 ms. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted on the participants’ data (errors and response times
[RT]) with group (patients or controls) as the between-subject
factor and prime (congruent or incongruent), response (left or
right hand) and object orientation (left or right) as the within-
subject factors.
Errors
Errors were rare (M = 3.64%, standard error [SE] = 0.5).
The ANOVA showed no main effect of either between- or
within-subject factors: group [F(1,34) = 3.300; P = 0.078;
η2 = 0.09]; prime [F(1,34) = 0.027; P = 0.871; η2 < 0.01];
response [F(1,34) = 0.156; P = 0.695; η2 < 0.01]; and orientation
[F(1,34) = 0.041; P = 0.840; η2 < 0.01] (Table 2). Neither did we
find interaction among factors (all F-values were less than 2.152).
Response Times
The mean RT and standard deviation (SD) were calculated for
each subject, and response times above 2 SDs of their own
individual mean were eliminated (4.3%).
We found no effect of vertical orientation [F(1,34) = 0.926;
P = 0.342; η2 < 0.03] or mapping responses [F(1,34) = 1.985;
P = 0.168; η2 < 0.06].
Globally, an increased RT of patients (M = 783 ms;
SE = 24) compared with controls (M = 671 ms; SE = 23) was
reflected by a significant main effect of group [F(1,34) = 11.492;
P = 0.002; η2 = 0.25]. We found no main effect of prime
[F(1,34) = 0.134; P = 0.717; η2 < 0.01]. RTs did not differ
significantly when the object was primed by either the
participant’s surname (M = 724 ms; SE = 19) or the surname
Rani (M = 729 ms; SE = 17). Neither did we find an effect of
response [F(1,34) = 0.233, P = 0.633; η2 < 0.01] or orientation
[F(1,34) = 0.007; P = 0.935; η2 < 0.01]. The only significant
interaction was between group, prime, response, and orientation
[F(1,34) = 8.536; P = 0.006; η2 = 0.21]. To facilitate reading, we
will present separately the analysis according to type of prime
(incongruent or congruent) and according to group (patients and
controls) (Table 3).
In the incongruent prime condition, group [F(1,34) = 2.638;
P = 0.114; η2 = 0.07] did not change the compatibility effect
(measured by the interaction of response × orientation), but
in the congruent prime condition, the 3-way interaction of
group × response × orientation was significant [F(1,34) = 6.202;
P = 0.018; η2 = 0.15]. When the prime was the participant’s
name, the temporal patterns of responses, which highlighted the
effects of compatibility and incompatibility, differed significantly
according to the group of participants.
In the control group, the interaction of response × orien-
tation, which measures the compatibility effect, was significant
[F(1,17) = 5.255; P = 0.035; η2 = 0.24], as was the 3-way
interaction of prime × response × orientation [F(1,17) = 6.642;
P = 0.020; η2 = 0.28]. For this group, in the congruent prime
condition, right-hand responses were faster when the orientation
of the object was also to the right (M = 658 ms; SE = 23)
rather than left (M = 677 ms; SE = 24) [F(1,17) = 6.582;
P = 0.020; η2 = 0.28]. Similarly, left-hand responses were
faster when the orientation of the object was also to the left
(M = 647 ms; SE = 24) rather than the right (M = 678 ms;
SE = 31) [F(1,17) = 5.802; P = 0.028; η2 = 0.25]. The interaction
of response × orientation was significant [F(1,17) = 9.602;
P = 0.007; η2 = 0.36]. By contrast, in the incongruent
prime condition, the interaction of response × orientation
was not significant [F(1,17) = 0.358; P = 0.558; η2 = 0.02]
(Figure 2).
In the patient group, the interaction of response× orientation
was not significant overall [F(1,17) = 0.354; P = 0.560;
η2 = 0.02], not modified by the prime condition [F(1,17) = 2.584;
P = 0.126; η2 = 0.13], nor significant in either the congruent
[F(1,17) = 0.390; P = 0.541; η2 = 0.13] or incongruent prime
condition [F(1,17) = 2.458; P = 0.135; η2 = 0.13] (Figure 2).
Discussion of Experiment 1
Response times of controls were shorter when the graspable
part of the object and the response hand were compatible
but only when the subject’s surname was used to prime
the object. When an imaginary surname was used as the
prime, no compatibility effect was apparent, findings in accord
with those of Constable et al. (2011) that specifying the
owner of the perceived object modulated affordance effects.
Participants might view their own surname as a request to
perform a certain action with the object, whereas seeing
another name might be interpreted that the other person
should perform the action. Therefore, using a participant’s
own name as a prime seems to be an ecological way to
lead subjects to build a sense of property of the perceived
object.
Nevertheless, this kind of prime seems insufficient to create
the sense of property in schizophrenia. Patients did not respond
faster in the case of compatibility than that of incompatibility
whether the objects were primed using their own or an
imaginary name. In this group, even when primed by the
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TABLE 2 | Error rates (SD) based on patient or control group, congruent or incongruent prime, left or right orientation, and left- or right-handed response
in Experiment 1.




Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Right Right 3.6 (1.4) 5.6 (1.5) 2.0 (0.8) 2.6 (0.6)
Left 5.6 (1.4) 4.7 (1.1) 1.4 (0.6) 3.1 (1.3)
Left Right 4.7 (1.2) 5.3 (2.0) 2.6 (1.0) 2.4 (0.8)
Left 4.7 (1.6) 3.6 (1.3) 4.1 (0.9) 2.3 (0.6)
TABLE 3 | Means (SD) of response times (in ms) according to patient or control group, congruent or incongruent prime, left or right orientation, and left-





Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Right Right 786 (32) 774 (22) 658 (23) 679 (26)
Left 785 (28) 790 (27) 677 (24) 674 (23)
Left Right 776 (27) 789 (27) 678 (31) 676 (24)
Left 787 (35) 777 (23) 647 (24) 677 (22)
subject’s surname, the visual perception of an object did not
potentiate the actions “normally” associated with it. So, we
can assume that for patients with schizophrenia, this type of
prime is not sufficiently relevant to allow the emergence of
sensorimotor compatibility between an object and action to
perform.
Globally, responses of subjects with schizophrenia were
slower even if they committed no more errors than controls
and whether or not the name used as a prime was their own.
Thus, it seems that additional cognitive cost is required
of patients to achieve the same results. More costly in
attentional resources, the implementation of controlled
processes is required if the motor simulation does not
emerge when the stimulus and response share sensorimotor
characteristics.
The use of the participant’s first name as a prime seems
insufficient for patients to perceive the action-relevant
features of prehensile objects. Indeed, the behavioral impact
of perceived object affordance seems to depend heavily
on the action context in which the object is presented,
carrying on the subject motor intentionalities. Studies in
healthy subjects have shown, for example, that naming
an object evokes gestural knowledge about its form and
function that automatically elicits action potentialities, whereas
passively viewing the object does not (Bub and Masson,
2006).
In a second experiment, to facilitate the perception of the
action-relevant features of an object and carry on an implicit
motor intention in the patient, we primed objects using action
sentences reflecting congruency with the use of the objects in
everyday life.
EXPERIMENT 2
If context and goal of action can modulate affordance effects
(Borghi et al., 2012), the use of action sentence primes with
sensorimotor characteristics congruent with the goal of action
induced by the conventional use of a presented object should
produce affordance effects in both groups. However, this effect




Subjects were 18 patients with schizophrenia (15 men, 3 women)
and 18 healthy controls (15 men, 3 women) recruited in the
same manner and using the same inclusion and exclusion
criteria as those of Experiment 1 (See Table 4 for demographic
comparisons).
The local ethics committee of Saint-Étienne approved the
study (N◦ IORG0007394), and informed written consent was
obtained from all participants.
For the power analysis, see Experiment 1.
Apparatus and Materials
Among the 22 everyday objects graspable by one hand used in
the previous experiment, six of them were presented in double
exemplary (for example two different saucepans, two different
bottles of detergent. . .). In this second experiment, we kept
16 single objects. We presented all objects in two horizontal
orientations (compatible with either right- or left-handed grasp)
but in only upright orientation. Each object was primed one
time by one action sentence congruent with goals of action
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FIGURE 2 | Mean response times (in ms) for Experiment 1 as a function of name prime (congruent or incongruent), object orientation (left or right),
and response hand (left or right) in the control group and in the group with schizophrenia. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
TABLE 4 | Comparison of ages, years of education, and scores on the







Age (years) 37.2 (4.8) 35.2 (6.9) t = −1.069; P = 0.293
Education (years) 11.5 (2.2) 12.6 (2.1) t = 1.542; P = 0.132
Edinburgh score (/20) 18.8 (1.1) 18.5 (1.8) t = −0.800; P = 0.429
PANSS positive 13.9 (3.6) / /
PANSS negative 17.2 (6.3) / /
Illness duration (months) 176.22 (71.4) / /
induced by the use of the object and another time by an
incongruent sentence (Appendix 2). We formulated the sentences
in relation to the photos of objects used in Experiment 1 by
asking 80 students to name the action verb and direct object
complement that seemed to them most related to the object
in each photo. We used those most often cited (>80%) and
subsequently asked the students to form pairs of pictures and
sentences that seemed to them most incongruent. The sentences
were built to be of almost the same length in French. Overall,
in this experiment, 64 pictures were displayed in the middle
of a computer screen (with the same characteristics of those in
Experiment 1) preceded by sentences written in black 32-point
Arial font.
Design and Procedure
To ensure that subjects read the sentences presented as primes,
we asked them to indicate as fast and accurately as possible
if the object pictured (e.g., an iron) was congruent with the
action sentence prime (for ironing clothes) or not (for cutting
bread). Each participant carried out two blocks of 64 trials with
a 3-min break between the blocks. These blocks differed in
terms of response mapping (right-hand congruency versus left-
hand incongruency and left-hand congruency versus right-hand
incongruency) and were counterbalanced between subjects. As
in Experiment 1, participants were instructed to keep their right
finger on the right response key (L) and their left finger on the
left response key (S) during the entire experiment. Response keys
were situated 15 cm apart and 20 cm in front of the screen on a
standard European (AZERTY) keyboard.
Each experimental trial started with the presentation of
an action sentence as a prime for 2000 ms followed by the
presentation of a photo of one object, which remained on
the screen until an answer was given up to 3000 ms. A brief
auditory tone on the computer informed participants of errors.
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Each participant received eight practice trials using a different
set of sentences and photos before each block. Depending on
the situation, the response hand could be on the same side
as the graspable part of the object (compatible orientation) or
on the opposite side (incompatible), and the action sentence
prime could be congruent or incongruent with the normal action
induced by the given object.
Results
For all conditions, participants responded within the required
time limit of 3000 ms. We evaluated data regarding participants’
errors and response times using ANOVA with group (patients or
controls) as the between-subject factor and prime (congruent or
incongruent), response (left or right hand), and object orientation
(left or right) as within-subject factors.
Errors
Errors were rare (M= 3.46%; SE= 0.4), and the ANOVA showed
no significant main effect of either between- or within-subject
factors: group [F(1,34) = 2.738; P = 0.107; η2 = 0.07]; prime
[F(1,34) = 0.386; P = 0.539; η2 = 0.01]; response [F(1,34) = 0.461;
P = 0.502; η2 = 0.01]; and orientation [F(1,34) = 2.400;
P = 0.131; η2 = 0.07]. Table 5 delineates error rates. We found
no interaction of factors (all F-values were less than 2.400).
Response Times
We calculated the mean response time and standard deviation for
each subject and excluded RTs above 2 SDs of the individual’s own
mean (4.4%).
We found no effect of mapping responses [F(1,34) = 1.227;
P < 0.276; η2 = 0.03].
The longer RTs of patients (M = 797 ms; SE = 35) than
controls (M = 594 ms, SE = 23) reflected a significant main
effect of group [F(1,34) = 22.897; P < 0.001; η2 = 0.4]. We
also found a main effect of prime [F(1,34) = 28.236; P < 0.001;
η2 = 0.5]. Response times were shorter when the prime was
congruent with the goal of action induced by the use of the
given object (M = 672 ms; SE = 20) than when the prime
was incongruent with it (M = 719 ms; SE = 23). However, we
found no effect of either response [F(1,34) = 0.663; P = 0.421;
η2 = 0.02] or orientation [F(1,34) = 0.180; P = 0.674; η2 < 0.01].
The only significant interaction was observed between group,
prime, response, and orientation [F(1,34) = 4.254; P = 0.047;
η2 = 0.11]. As in Experiment 1, we present separate analyses
according to the congruency or incongruency of the prime and
the patient or control group (Table 6).
The 3-way interaction of group × response × orientation
was significant when the prime was congruent [F(1,34) = 8.774;
P = 0.006; η2 = 0.21] but not incongruent [F(1,34) = 0.340;
P = 0.563; η2 < 0.01]. When the prime was congruent with the
goal of action induced by the use of the object, the temporal
patterns of response differed significantly according to the
participant group.
In the control group, the interaction of response × orien-
tation, which measures the effect of compatibility, was not
significant [F(1,17) = 2.890; P = 0.107; η2 = 0.15], but the 3-way
interaction of prime × response × orientation [F(1,17) = 10.359,
P = 0.005, η2 = 0.38] was. In the congruent prime condition,
the interaction of response × orientation was significant
[F(1,17) = 9.446; P = 0.007; η2 = 0.36]. Right-hand responses
were faster when the object was also oriented to the right
TABLE 5 | Error rates (SD) based on patient or control group, congruent or incongruent prime, left or right orientation, and left- or right-handed response
in Experiment 2.
Patients Controls
Response hand Object orientation Primes
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Right Right 4.0 (1.1) 3.7 (1.2) 3.0 (1.1) 2.3 (0.7)
Left 3.7 (1.3) 5.1 (1.8) 2.0 (0.8) 2.7 (0.9)
Left Right 4.4 (1.6) 2.7 (0.9) 2.3 (1.0) 2.3 (0.9)
Left 5.7 (1.7) 4.0 (1.0) 3.7 (1.0) 3.7 (1.2)
TABLE 6 | Means (SD) of response times (in ms) according to patient or control group, congruent or incongruent prime, left or right orientation, and left-
or right-handed response in Experiment 2.
Patients Controls
Response hand Object orientation Primes
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Right Right 757 (38) 837 (36) 552 (18) 621 (33)
Left 733 (39) 850 (45) 577 (25) 612 (31)
Left Right 780 (38) 810 (43) 601 (29) 611 (25)
Left 802 (36) 803 (44) 570 (25) 606 (26)
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(M = 552 ms; SE = 18) rather than to the left (M = 577 ms;
SE = 25) [F(1,17) = 5.428; P = 0.032; η2 = 0.24]. Similarly, left-
hand responses were faster when the object was also oriented
to the left (M = 570 ms; SE = 25) rather than to the right
(M = 601 ms; SE = 29) [F(1,17) = 5.357; P = 0.033; η2 = 0.24].
By contrast, in the incongruent prime condition, the interaction
of response × orientation was not significant [F(1,17) = 0.061;
P = 0.808; η2 < 0.01] (Figure 3).
In the patient group, the interaction of response× orientation
was not significant [F(1,17) = 0.666; P = 0.426; η2 = 0.04] and
not modified by the prime condition [F(1,17) = 1.288; P = 0.272;
η2 = 0.07], whether congruent [F(1,17) = 2.505; P = 0.132;
η2 = 0.13] or incongruent [F(1,17) = 0.280; P= 0.604; η2 = 0.02]
(Figure 3).
Discussion of Experiment 2
Controls responded more quickly when orientation was
compatible between the graspable part of the object and the
response hand but only when the prime was a congruent action
sentence. An incongruent sentence cued no compatibility effect.
These results show that affordance effects can be modulated
according to variations in context and particularly according
to the goals of action inferred from the experimental setting.
Thus, specification of the proper conventional use of an object
facilitates the simulation of a particular pattern of motor
responses. By contrast, incongruency between the action
sentence and perceived object disrupts the affordance effect.
These results suggest that if the action implied by a sentence
cannot be performed with the object, subjects might not activate
the affordances usually provided by the object.
Nevertheless, the subjects with schizophrenia demonstrated
no sensorimotor compatibility effect regardless of the congruency
of the semantic prime. There was no action potentiation effect
even when the sentence and implied action of the object’s use
were congruent, and their responses were not faster when the
target orientation and response hand were compatible.
However, the relatively low and similar error rates between the
two groups of subjects demonstrate the correct understanding
of instructions and good involvement to perform the task
properly of all participants. These results also highlight that
patients had no more difficulty than controls in responding to
perceived congruency between the sentence prime and target
object, which indicated their understanding of the function of
the everyday objects presented to them on the screen. Thus, all
participants seemed sensitive to the congruency between the aim
of action cued semantically and the perceived object. However,
though we observed that patients considered semantic context,
the expression of the goal of the action seemed insufficient
to create action potentiation during the perception of the
objects.
DISCUSSION
We hypothesized that enriching the contextual environment
could influence affordance effects in healthy subjects and facilitate
their emergence in patients with schizophrenia. Adapting a
paradigm inspired by Tucker and Ellis (1998) to observe the
potential modulation of affordance effects, we conducted two
experiments in which we introduced a picture of a graspable
object using a semantic prime to suggest a sense of ownership
of the object (Experiment 1) or goals of action for its use
(Experiment 2).
The control group demonstrated the emergence of sensori-
motor compatibility effects, but only when the prime was
congruent with the perceived object. Indeed, the modulation
of the environmental context by conceptual priming influenced
the sensorimotor compatibility effects. In Experiment 1, they
emerged only when the objects were preceded by the participant’s
surname as a reference for ownership of the perceived object,
and in Experiment 2, they emerged when action sentences were
congruent with goals of action induced by the conventional
use of the perceived object. Action potentialities can emerge
through simulation mechanisms when the meaning of a stimulus
is relevant to the action and when the expected motor response
shares components of this action (Girardi et al., 2010).
In our study, context seems to act as a resource to potentiate
action when it is congruent with the action implied by the
perceived object and with the intention of the subject. The
presentation of a congruent prime would enable the preparation
of motor action, resulting in the emergence of the affordance
effect. Indeed, Vandevoorde (2011) showed that an efficient
coupling between the perception of and action associated with
an object that is perceived beneficial to the subject will facilitate
the reactivation of this kinesthetic image in a similar situation
by reinforcement and motor habituation. In this case, the object
becomes a “visuomotor opportunity” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia,
2008) that is identified based on its motor potentialities. The
brain would be able to recognize its environment solely according
to these potentialities even in the absence of the superior
mobilization of reasoning, so the motor system would then fully
participate in identifying and understanding the surrounding
world.
Though many studies have focused on the influence of
physical context, it seems important to determine the influence
of other kinds of context, such as social and functional context,
on the activation of affordance (Van Dam et al., 2010; Borghi
and Riggio, 2015). In Experiment 1, we observed, we believe
for the first time, the potential influence of one’s surname, an
example of social and personal data with which we grow from
childhood, to simulate an individual’s appropriate actions toward
an object when the name is used as a prime for the object’s
perception. In Experiment 2, we measured the influence of the
input of functional knowledge using action s (“to drink coffee”)
to prime the presentation of an object (“a cup”). We wanted
to ensure that the participant simulates the expected action:
in this example, the most appropriate way to use the cup to
drink coffee is to grasp it by its handle. If Van Dam et al.’s
(2010, p. 5) showed “that preparing an action congruent to the
typical, functional use of an object, facilitates processing of the
word denoting the object,” then we demonstrated the inverse
relationship here.
The results of both our experiments provide further evidence
that affordances are both intrinsic to objects and flexible,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1551
fpsyg-07-01551 October 3, 2016 Time: 10:38 # 11
Sevos et al. Contextual Affordance Effects in Schizophrenia
FIGURE 3 | Mean response times (in ms) for Experiment 2 as a function of action prime (congruent or incongruent), object orientation (left or right),
and response hand (left or right) in the control group and in the group with schizophrenia. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
that they involve the subject and his environment. Even if
affordances are initiated automatically, they are then selected
to the current task (Borghi and Riggio, 2015). Indeed, we
also showed that an incongruent context did not provoke the
emergence of affordance effects even when perceived objects
were the same. Buccino et al. (2009) tested the modulation
of the motor system when an object’s features are violated,
such as when the handles of graspable objects are broken,
and found no activation of affordance in the absence of
pragmatic conditions to perform an action associated with an
object. Further studies are needed to detail the mechanisms
underlying a total absence of sensorimotor activation or
an inhibition of the action potentialities in the case of
incongruent context (Anelli et al., 2012; Borghi and Riggio,
2015).
In our subjects with schizophrenia, selected primes did not
seem to share sensorimotor features in a relevant way with the
current task. Even priming the perception of a visual object using
a semantic context to reinforce the sense of property or goals of
action of the object did not automatically potentiate the action
associated with its use.
In this study, patients were slower than controls in both
tasks. Our previous study (Sevos et al., 2013) revealed no such
slowdown when we measured the compatibility between the
spatial localization of a stimulus and the motor response (Simon
task), which seemed to indicate that visuo-spatial integration
is automatic in both patients with schizophrenia and healthy
subjects. However, in an affordance task, longer response times of
patients than controls suggested no automatic binding between
perception and action in patients. In that previous work, we
interpreted the increased response time as the time to implement
controlled processes more costly in attentional resources.
Our current findings again challenge the precept that the
mere observation of graspable objects is sufficient to evoke their
affordances because objects elicit components of appropriate
motor programs associated with object interaction (Borghi and
Riggio, 2015). For example, Yu et al. (2014) failed to replicate
compatibility effects when participants were not explicitly
instructed to imagine picking up pictured objects. However,
in both of our experiments, patients with schizophrenia made
no more errors than controls, reinforcing the idea that they
had functional knowledge of the presented objects-if the object
was upright or inverted, if one drinks coffee with a cup or
frying pan. Though Garbarini and Adenzato (2004) claim that
motor simulation is the only way to develop knowledge of
the action possibilities made available by objects, we cannot
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agree. Indeed, despite the lack of sensorimotor stimulation,
our subjects with schizophrenia usually demonstrated the
capacity to use everyday life objects in an appropriate way.
In this case, simulation could be considered as the default
procedure that can occasionally be supplemented or overridden
by theoretical considerations, as proposed by Jeannerod and
Pacherie (2004).
In pathology, Cattaneo et al. (2007) showed, for example,
the inability of autistic children to rely on a motor preparation
before executing a movement even if they desired to achieve a
requested goal and were fully able to carry out the requested
actions. The researchers recorded electromyographic (EMG)
activity in children with autism and children with normal
development as they executed a gesture (arm flexion toward
itself) (Experiment 2). The gesture could lead to two different
actions and so involved two different intentions-bringing a
piece of food to the mouth (eating action) or putting a piece
of paper into a container placed on the shoulder (placing
action). Controls demonstrated the increased activity of muscles
responsible for the final goal of the action (eating a piece
of food) as soon as the action began (reaching for he piece
of food). In the children with autism, those muscles became
active only during the bringing-to-the-mouth phase. In another
experiment (Experiment 1), those authors showed an indirect
link between the activity of mirror neurons supposed to support
the understanding of the intentions of others and sensorimotor
simulation. Using the same procedure, they showed increased
activation of jaw muscles as controls observed the eating action
but not during the placing action, thus demonstrating the
existence of links between motor intention and sensorimotor
simulations that activate the muscles involved in the final action.
In contrast, the children with autism showed no muscle activation
while observing either eating or placing actions. The authors
interpret these results as a lack of motor activation underlying
action-understanding in children with autism; the children may
understand the others’ intentions cognitively (particularly when
semantic cues are given by a piece of the object) but not
experientially.
Motor facilitation during action observation, which putatively
reflects the activity of mirror neurons, could also be reduced
in schizophrenia. In their study, Enticott et al.’s (2008) group
administered transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) while
presenting video clips showing the abductor pollicis (APB) of
the right hand during different activities (thumb movement, pen
grasp, or handwriting) and recorded motor-evoked potentials
(MEP) from the right APB muscle of subjects. The significant
increase in the amplitude of MEP for these three activities
compared with the baseline in controls and the absence of
any change in patients with schizophrenia led these authors to
conclude that reduced activation of mirror neurons impairs the
ability to experience an internal simulation of other’s behavior.
Using our experimental paradigm, associated with
physiological measures (TMS or MEP for example), could
be relevant to objectify the underlying sensorimotor process in
schizophrenia. In the absence of such studies, our behavioral
results seem to suggest that our subjects with schizophrenia
also have impaired ability to experience an internal simulation
of motor action potentialities when they perceived graspable
objects, which would indicate that all activities of daily life
would require the involvement of higher cognitive processes
rather than lower level sensorimotor processes. Patients
expressed, for example, knowing how to set a table but needing
to think about each step to accomplish the task. Jeannerod
(2001), Gallese (2009), and Vandevoorde (2011) agree that it
is precisely this sensorimotor simulation that not only enables
the subject to anticipate an action but provides as well a
“motor thought,” an automatic, almost intuitive knowledge
from his surrounding world. This ability to anticipate his
actions should allow the subject to act seamlessly in his
environment and feel familiar with it and current social
situations. At a perceptual level, objects and persons generally
appear familiar and intelligible according to our expectations of
them from past experience. We postulate that the impairment
of sensorimotor simulation could partly explain the loss of
this “common sense” of things, sometimes encountered in
schizophrenia. If perception appears deprived of its fullness
and no longer related to motor actions, but is more like a
purely receptive process (Parnas and Handest, 2003), it is
not surprising that subjects with schizophrenia can feel a
strangeness, that is “when the meanings of objects in the world
(e.g., “What is this chair for?”) and of the actions of others (e.g.,
“Why is he laughing?”) appear uncanny” (Stanghellini, 2000,
p. 779).
Similarly, Fuchs and Schlimme (2009) claimed that the
disintegration of all normally automatic behaviors of everyday
life is a major feature of schizophrenia that more broadly
reflects a “disembodiment” of the self or of the relation to
objects (see also Fuchs, 2005; Stanghellini, 2009; Sass, 2013). Our
experimental results seem to converge with clinical observations
as well as psychopathological and phenomenological data that
demonstrate a dissociation of patients with schizophrenia and
their environment.
The study of pathology such as that of schizophrenia, which
precisely undermines the notion of coherence, requires a more
unified, coherent, and comprehensive approach that takes into
account concepts and methods based in embodied cognition
(Glenberg et al., 2013).
Limitations and Implications for Future
Studies
This pilot study is limited by our small sample size and the
relatively weak positive and negative symptoms of patients that
might restrict the generalization of our findings.
Future studies with larger samples of subjects with
schizophrenia are warranted to confirm our findings, which
suggest the impairment of sensorimotor integration even in
patients with milder symptoms.
We explored the emergence of object affordance effects in
schizophrenia by varying experimental contexts and found that
the use of conceptual priming (making the action more specific
or reinforcing the purpose of the action for the patient) seems
insufficient to trigger motor simulation when subjects perceive
objects used in everyday life. In futures studies, we propose to
enhance context by introducing visuomotor or motor priming.
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Indeed, the literature shows that the state of the motor system can
influence the perception of objects (Craighero et al., 2002), but a
phase of motor training can also be used to facilitate the effect of
sensorimotor compatibility (Borghi et al., 2007).
In addition, the use of brain imaging techniques and
electrophysiological measures enhance understanding of the
cerebral and physiological mechanisms involved when control
subjects perform tasks that involve motor simulation (e.g., Grezes
and Decety, 2001, 2002; Buccino et al., 2009). Using such
techniques in patients could similarly improve our understanding
of these phenomena in schizophrenia.
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